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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
u. DALE WILLIAMS, Executive
Director, Department of
Administrative Services,
State of Utah, as
Administrator of the UTAH
STATE INSURANCE FUND,

Supreme Court No. 19289

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
WILLIAM J. BLISS, VERA BLISS
and THE SECOND INJURY FUND,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a partial summary judgment entered
on the 5th day of May, 1983, by Judge Judith Billings in the
Third District Court in and for the District of Salt Lake County.
PISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT
The District Court Judge ruled that the appellee Allstate
Insurance Company, was entitled to partial summary judgment on
question of whether or not the State Insurance Fund was entitled
reimbursement of $18,720.00 paid into the Second Injury Fund
"fJon the death of the appellee William J. Bliss and Veora Bliss,
decedent, pursuant to an order of the Industrial Commission and

Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-68.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant is asking this court to

reverse the pan 1 ,.

summary judgement of the Third District Court and determine t;,e·
pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

Section 35-1-62, the State Insuran:'

Fund is entitled to reimbursement of the $18, 720. 00 it paid w.
the Second

Injury Fund pursuant

to

Utah Code Ann.

Sectic:

35-1-68(2) (a).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 30, 1980, Karen V. Bliss was fatally injure:
in an automobile accident which occurred on the airport road. {R.Jc;
She died the following day at LDS Hospital after extensive measur;o
were taken to save her life.

(R.108)

At the time of her accident, Ms. Bliss was in the couu:
of her employment, with the Airport Shuttle Parking, as a shutt:e
van driver.

(R.108)

Airport Shuttle Parking was insured by t:e

Utah State Insurance Fund for worker's compensation purpose,,
(R. 108)

As a result of Ms. Bliss' accident, the State Insuran>

Fund has paid medical and funeral benefits in the sum of $10,131.4'.
( R.

of

10 8)
the

The Utah State Insurance Fund, pursuant to an oro':
Utah

Industrial Commission and Utah Code Ann. Sectt:

35-1-68 2(a),
Fund.

has also paid

(R. 109, 117)

$18,720.00 into the Second In]U'.

There is no dispute on this appeal regard,

the State Insruance Fund's right to reimbursment on the rnedr•::
and funeral

benefits paid as the parties stipulated to ttnt

the District Court.

(R. 167)
2

In March of 1982, William J, and Veora Bliss filed
" ,·omplaint for the wrongful death of their daughter, Karen
i'p111st
!11

v.

Bliss,

the driver of the other vehicle, Sue Ellen Dart. (R. 132)

!980, prior to the filing of the wrongful death action, the

state Insurance Fund notified William J, and Veora Bliss, through
their attorney, of the rights of the insurance carrier in a wrongful
death cause of action and of the method of disbursement of proceeds
recovered pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-63.

(R. 120)

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
UTAH STATUTORY AND CASE LAW MAKE IT
CLEAR THAT THE $18,720.00 WHICH THE
STATE INSURANCE FUND HAS PAID TO THE
SECOND INJURY FUND rs "COMPENSATION"
When an employee with no dependents is killed in a
JOb

related accident, the Worker's Compensation Act requires

the employer or its insurance carrier to pay the sum of $18,720.00
into what is called the Second Injury Fund, which is maintained
by

the State Treasurer.

The State Treasurer is regarded more

or less as the banker or custodian of the Second Injury Fund.
Wherever

the Worker's Compensation Act refers to payments to

the State Treasurer in reality, those are payments into the Second
In]ury Fund.
The Utah Supreme Court in Star y. Indystrial Commission.
615 P.2d 436

(1980)

defined compensation to include payments

made to the Second Injury Fund:
"Compensation," as used in the amendment in the
constitution, means the same as it is used and
defined in the compensation act, i.e. any payment
3

required by the act to be paid to a workman or his
dependents, or for their benefit, or into the
State Treasury, for the special purpose of the
compensation act. This includes disability
payments death benefits, medical and hospital
expenses burial expenses and payment to the
State Treasury as proyided by the act.
(Emphasis added)

.l.d. at 438.
Therefore, the money the State Insruance Fund has paid into th;
Second Injury Fund was a "payment required by the Act to be
into the State Treasury."

made

The only payments required by the

Act to be made to the State Treasury are those payments suer,
as the $18,720.00 herein involved which an employer or its insurance
carrier must pay to the Second Injury Fund.

Indeed the

s..tQ1

decision dealt specifically with the provision of the Utah Worker''
Compensation Act requiring the employer or its insurance carritr
to make payment to the Second Injury Fund upon the death of
employee's wife or dependents, specifically payment of $18,
is required by Utah Code Ann. Section

35-1-68(2) (a),

(a) If the commission has made a determination that there are no dependents of
the deceased, it may, prior to a lapse of
one year from the date of death of a
deceased employee, issue a temporary order
for the employer or insurance carrier to pay
into the second injury fund the sum of
$18,720. The $18,720. shall be reduced by
the amount of any weekly compensation payments
paid to or due the deceased between the date
of the accident and death. Should a dependency
claim be filed subsequent to the issuance of
such an order and, therefore, a determination
of dependency is made by the comwission, the
award shall first be paid out of the sum deposited
for credit to the second injury fund by the
employer or insurance carrier before any
further claim may be asserted against the
employer or insurance carrier. In the event
4

an

no dependency claim is filed within one year
from the date of death, the commission's temporary
order shall become permanent and final. If no
temporary order has been issued and no claim
for dependency has been filed within one year
from the date of death, the commission may
issue a permanent order at any time requiring
the carrier or employer to pay $18,720, into
the second injury fund. Any claim for compensation
by a dependent must be filed with the commission
within one year from the date of death of the
deceased.
The Utah State Insurance Fund paid the $18,720.00, which is the
subject matter of this litigation, into the Second Injury Fund
pursuant to this statute.

decision makes it undeniably

clear that this $18,720.00 was compensation payable under the
Utah Worker's Compensation Act.
POINT II
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION
35-1-62, THE UTAH STATE INSURANCE FUND
IS ENTITLED TO FULL REIMBURSEMENT FOR ANY
AND ALL COMPENSATION PAID INCLUDING ANY
AMOUNT PAID INTO THE SECOND INJURY FUND
The State Insurance Fund is entitled to full reimbursement
of the $18,720.00 it has paid into the Second Injury Fund in
reference to Karen Bliss' death.

Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-62,

which follows, makes this explicitly clear:
35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by
wrongful acts of persons other than employer
officer, agent, or employee of said employer-Rights of employer or insurance carrier in
Notice of intention to proceed against third
party -- Right to maintain action not involving
employee-employer relationship -- Disbursement
of proceeds of recovery. When any injury or
death for which compensation is payable under
this title shall have been caused by the
wrongful act or neglect of a person other than.
an employer. officer. agent, or employee of said
5

employer. the injured employee, or in case of
death hjs dependents. may claim compensation
and the injured employee or his heirs or personal
representative may also have an action for
damages against such thjrd person.
If compensation is claimed and the employer or insurance
carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation,
the employer or insurance carrier shall become
trustee of the cause of action against the third
party and may bring and maintain the action
either in its own name or in the name of the
injured employee, or his heirs or the personal
representative of the deceased, provided the
employer or carrier may not settle and release
the cause of action without the consent of
the commission. Before proceeding against the
third party, the injured employee, or, in case
of death, his heirs, shall give written notice
of such intention to the carrier or other
person obligated for the compensation payments,
in order to give such person a reasonable
opportunity to enter an appearance in the
proceeding.
For the purposes of this section and
notwithstanding the provisions of section
35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs
or personal representative may also maintain
an action for damages against subcontractors,
general contractors, independent contractors,
property owners or their lessees or assigns,
not occupying an employee-employer relationship
with the injured or deceased employee at the
time of his injury or death.
If any recovery is obtained aaainst such
third person it shall be disbursed as follows;
(1) The reasonable expense of the action,
including attorneys' fees, shall be paid and
charged proportionately against the parties as
their interests may appear. Any such fee
chargeable to the employer or carrier is to be
a credit upon any fee payable by the injured
employee or, in the case of death, by the
dependents, for any recovery and against the
third party.
(2)
payments
payments
of costs

The person liable for compensation
shall be reimbursed in full for all
made less the proportionate share
and attorney's fees provided for

6

in subsection Ill.
. .
(3) The balance shall be paid to the
inJured employee or his heirs in case of
death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy
in full any
thereafter accruing
against the person liable for compensation.
(underlining added)
This

statute,

particularly subparagraph 2, clearly

and unambiguously mandates reimbursement to the "person liable"
for

"compensation" in full.

and Star V·

Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-68(2) (a)

Industrial Commission, 613 P.2d 436, make it clear

that the $18,720.00 is "compensation".

In this case, Karen

Bliss' employer, through the State Insurance Fund, is the "person
liable" for that compensation.

Therefore, the Utah State Insurance

Fund should be reimbursed in full for the $18,720.00 which it
has paid

to

the Second Injury Fund in conjunction with Karen

Bliss' death.

Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-62 outlines the disbur-

sement order in cases such as this in explicit detail thus that
order should be amended only by the legislature if at all and
not by Court decisions.
The District Court Judge relied upon Oliveras
v. Caribou-Four Corners. Inc., 598 P.2d 1320 (1979).

Undoubtedly

Ql1veras does impact upon third party actions under the Worker's
Compensation Act.

However, Oliveras does not deny the employer

and/or the insurance carrier their statutory rights created by
the clear language of Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-62, to recover
C'01npensa ti on expended as a result of the wrongdoing of a tortfeasor •
-,.t,P money that the State Insurance Fund bas paid into the Second
7

Injury Fund constitutes a statutory special damage independer:
of the damages the heirs may claim on their own behalf.
State

Insurance Fund would not have been required to pay

t·,.

$18,720.00 but for the wrongful doing of the tortfeasor.
Certainly, Oliveras prohibits the employer and/or fo
insurance carrier from divesting non dependant heirs of the,,
general damages.

However, it would be unreasonable to interprr,

Oliveras as denying the insurance carrier their statutory right:
clearly defined by Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-62.

Those

rights are in reality an item of special damages.

Such an inter-

pretation of the decision,

in essence, would create a cause o'.

action on the one hand while rendering it remediless on the
In ad di ti on, to permit that result would allow the tortfeasjr
a windfall benefit from his wrongdoing.

In this case, the wrongdoin:

of the tortfeasor has resulted in a loss to the State Insurance
Fund of

$18,720.00.

'

This item of special damage is separate

from the claims of the non-dependent heirs in this case and thr
State Insurance Fund's right to reimbursement should not be confuse:
with the heirs'

right to recover.

The $18,720.00 which the Ut3'

State Insurance Fund has paid into the Second Injury Fund i:
a separate item of damage for which the tortfeasor is statutorii:
obligated to reimburse the Fund.
CONCLUSION
The Utah State Insurance Fund in the instant case
entitled to reimbursement for the $18, 7 20. 00 which it has P'
the State Treasurer for deposit in the Second Injury Fund.
8

payment to the State Treasurer is tantamount to a statutorily
,,eated special damage.
0

nly

Oliveras, limited the right of reimbursement

in the sense that the insurance carrier and/or the employer

, annot divest non-dependent heirs of their general damages. Oliveras,
however,

cannot be read to completely eliminate the right of

reimbursement of special damages as is clearly delineated in
the worker's Compensation Act.

This interpretation of Oliveras

insures the rights of the heirs under the wrongful death statute
while also protecting the rights of the employers and/or insurance
carriers created by the Worker's Compensation Act.

Any other

interpretation will permit the tortfeasor to escape the full
consequences of his wrongdoing and, in reality, nullify Section
35-1-62.

To adopt the interpretation of opposing counsel would

amend the statute by court ruling rather than by legislative
act.
Appellant, the Utah State Insurance Fund respectfully
requests this court to reverse the Third Judicial Courts granting
of partial summary judgment and enter an order entitling the
Utah State Insurance Fund reimbursement from the tortfeasor for
the $18,720.00 which it has paid into the Second Injury Fund.
DATED THIS

of October, 1983.
BLACK & MOORE
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